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Humans are characterized by an extreme dependence on culturally transmitted informa-
tion and recent formal theory predicts that natural selection should favor adaptive learning
strategies that facilitate effective copying and decision making. One strategy that has
attracted particular attention is conformist transmission, deﬁned as the disproportionately
likely adoption of the most common variant. Conformity has historically been emphasized
as signiﬁcant in the social psychology literature, and recently there have also been reports
of conformist behavior in non-human animals. However, mathematical analyses differ in
how important and widespread they expect conformity to be, and relevant experimental
work is scarce, and generates ﬁndings that are both mutually contradictory and inconsis-
tent with the predictions of the models. We review the relevant literature considering the
causation, function, history, and ontogeny of conformity, and describe a computer-based
experiment on human subjects that we carried out in order to resolve ambiguities. We
found that only when many demonstrators were available and subjects were uncertain
was subject behavior conformist. A further analysis found that the underlying response
to social information alone was generally conformist. Thus, our data are consistent with a
conformist use of social information, but as subjects’ behavior is the result of both social
and asocial inﬂuences, the resultant behavior may not be conformist. We end by relating
these ﬁndings to an embryonic cognitive neuroscience literature that has recently begun to
explore the neural bases of social learning. Here conformist transmission may be a particu-
larly useful case study, not only because there are well-deﬁned and tractable opportunities
to characterize the biological underpinnings of this form of social learning, but also because
early ﬁndings imply that humans may possess speciﬁc cognitive adaptations for effective
social learning.
Keywords: conformity, social learning, cultural transmission, cultural evolution
In 1963, ethologist Niko Tinbergen argued that to fully under-
stand behavior in biology it is necessary to consider it from four
different perspectives, that of its history, ontogeny, function, and
causation. Whilst heuristics such of these have the potential to
constrain research as much as assist it (Laland et al., 2011a) the
realization of answers to Tinbergen’s four questions is often a
very helpful target for research, encouraging a broad perspec-
tive on behavior, and fostering interdisciplinary approaches. Here
we focus on behavioral conformity, a topic that has received
considerable attention from at least three of these perspectives.
Below we summarize insights into conformity derived from social
and developmental psychology, cultural evolution modeling and
experimentation, animal social learning, and cognitive neuro-
science. As the approaches of these ﬁelds do not map cleanly
onto Tinbergen’s questions, we organize our analysis on a disci-
plinary basis, but draw attention to which of Tinbergen’s ques-
tions is being addressed in each case. We conclude that the
study of conformity has been hampered by deﬁnitional incon-
sistency and experimental limitations and recognize the need for
a more comprehensive theoretical framework if researchers are to
progress toward a common understanding that spans these diverse
ﬁelds.
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY LITERATURE
The earliest investigations into conformity were carried out by
social psychologists during the twentieth century andwere focused
very much on its causation; that is, on the social contexts that
elicited it (Jenness, 1932; Sherif, 1935;Asch, 1955). In an extremely
inﬂuential paper, Solomon Asch (Asch, 1955) described the obser-
vation that adults would willingly abandon their own perceptual
judgment in a very simple visual task when faced with a group of
confederates who disagreed with them. Asch termed this behav-
ior conformity, supposing the deference to the group norm to be
driven by a desire to receive social approval. Such a ﬁnding has
been replicated a huge number of times across age groups and
cultures and a large number of factors that inﬂuence whether or
not individuals conform have been identiﬁed including group size
(Asch, 1955; Bond, 2005), task difﬁculty and importance (Baron
et al., 1996), culture (Bond and Smith, 1996) motivation (Griske-
vicius et al., 2006), and mood (Tong et al., 2008). Whilst social
psychology, replete with empirical data, has successfully identiﬁed
many factors inﬂuencing when individuals adopt the decisions of
others, it has struggled to unify such ﬁndings into a single theo-
retical framework. Perhaps the most successful attempt is Social
Impact Theory (Latane, 1981; Latane andWolf, 1981;Nowak et al.,
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1990), which characterizes social inﬂuence as a force, analogous to
a physical force such as electro-magnetism, that acts on an indi-
vidual. Factors proposed to inﬂuence the magnitude of this force
are its strength (determined by factors such as the age and status of
the source), immediacy, (proximity in space-time to the observer),
and the number of people in the group to which the observer is
exposed. Social Impact Theory can effectively explain the dimin-
ishing effect of increasing the number of confederates in the Asch
experiments (Latane, 1981), andwas also extended to caseswhere a
majority conﬂictedwith aminority (Latane andWolf, 1981).How-
ever, its variables of strength and immediacy – precisely that which
distinguished it from other models (e.g., Tanford and Penrod,
1984) – came up against conﬂicting empirical ﬁndings and where
effects were found they were typically of a very low magnitude
(Mullen, 1985, 1986; Jackson, 1986). Furthermore, these theories
were largely based on studies involving the adoption of arbitrary
or bizarre group decisions and so their ability to understand social
inﬂuence more generally, particularly in the context of evolution,
is limited. Accordingly, the ambitions of theories of social inﬂu-
ence from social psychology, although valuable contributions to
the study of social learning, were never fully realized.
Nonetheless, social inﬂuence theories were very successful in
accounting for group size effects. Moreover, social psychology is
also the source of a valuable distinctionbetween informational and
normative motivations for conforming to a group norm (Deutsch
and Gerard, 1955). This distinction came about as researchers
attempted to understand why their subjects were conforming to
clearly incorrect decisions. They argued for two goals on the part
of the subject, one to be correct, but a second to earn positive
appraisal from others through agreement. The former is an infor-
mational goal, the latter a normative goal. As the simplicity of
the task in the Asch experiments seems to preclude an informa-
tional goal, it has been argued that the subjects were conforming
in order to achieve a normative reward, received by being in agree-
ment with your group mates. Surprisingly given this, Deutsch and
Gerard (1955) found that some subjects would still choose the
clearly incorrect answer even when they made their decision in the
absence of confederates. They took this to mean that the confeder-
ates were also exerting some informational inﬂuence and that the
subjects may really have believed the group decisions. An alterna-
tive explanation is that, even when apparently isolated, individuals
may ﬁnd normative tendencies hard to resist.
CULTURAL EVOLUTION MODELING
Impetus to the study of conformity was also derived from cul-
tural evolution theory. Starting in the 1970s, a group of theoretical
evolutionary biologists began to investigate culture and the social
transmission of information using mathematical evolutionary
models (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Lumsden and Wilson,
1981; Boyd andRicherson, 1985). Central to this approachwas set-
ting the use of social information in an evolutionary context (that
is, considering its “function” and “evolutionary history,” in terms
of Tinbergen’s questions) and attempting to understand when and
how individuals should come to rely on social transmission to
maximize their ﬁtness. Individuals were predicted to be equipped
with a wide range of cultural transmission biases that dictate when
they copy others and who they copy (Boyd and Richerson, 1985;
Feldman et al., 1996; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Schlag, 1998,
1999; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and McElreath, 2003;
Laland, 2004; Enquist et al., 2007; Wakano and Aoki, 2007; Kendal
et al., 2009). Cultural evolutionists used the term conformity to
describe a particular learning rule by which an individual was dis-
proportionately likely to adopt themajority decision (see Boyd and
Richerson, 1985, p.206, see Figure 1). Mathematical models estab-
lished that conforming is an effective strategy in a spatially variable
environment with migration between subpopulations, because it
helps individuals tohome inon the locally adaptive behavior (Boyd
and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Nakahashi et al.,
forthcoming). In this respect, the cultural evolutionist notion of
conformity ﬁts well with an informational notion of conformity –
people are expected to conform because it leads them to acquire
valuable ﬁtness-enhancing information. Nonetheless, the evolu-
tion of this tendency to conform could also plausibly explain the
existence of normative conformity (Boyd and Richerson, 1985;
Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Moreover, different groups can con-
form to different variants under the action of a conformist bias,
with the potential to explain the combination of stable intergroup
heterogeneity and intragroup homogeneity seen in human pop-
ulations, and potentially promote cultural group selection (Boyd
and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Kendal et al.,
2009).
However, theoretical analyses have found conﬂicting results
when investigating the adaptive value of a conformist response
FIGURE 1 | Conformity (the dashed line) is just one of several learning
rules that result in increasingly likely adoption of a trait as it increases
in frequency, however, it is unique as the tendency toward the most
popular trait is disproportionate given its frequency. A proportionate
tendency, equivalent to random copying (solid line), results in a probability
of adoption equal to trait frequency, whereas anti-conformity (dotted line)
resists the most popular choice and has the opposite population
consequences to conformity. Of these frequency dependent rules, only
conformity leads to homogenous group behavior.
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to social information. For example, some models have found that
conformity evolves alongside less discriminate social learning and
fares well even in the face of a spatially and temporally vari-
able environment (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd,
1998). However, these models have been criticized as they assume
that individuals have access to all behavioral variants at all times
and merely have to choose the correct option. The critics claim
that when this assumption is relaxed conformity suffers (Eriksson
et al., 2007). However, Eriksson et al.’s models could be argued
to be no more realistic than Boyd, Richerson, Henrich et al.’s, as
here each incidence of environmental change means an entirely
new behavior must be developed from scratch. Equally important
is the extent of spatial and temporal variation, since the former
promotes reliance on conformity while the latter selects against
it (Hoppitt et al., 2010; Nakahashi et al., forthcoming). Thus the
extent to which conformity is expected to be adaptive is contested,
but the evidence from theoretical models on balance leads us to
expect a broad range of conditions under which it will be utilized.
The huge amount of empirical data from social psychology
might be thought to clarify this issue, as researchers could empir-
ically determine whether, and under what circumstances, human
subjects displayed a conformist tendency. However, this is unfor-
tunately not the case for two reasons. Firstly, although a conformist
would be expected to behave like subjects in the Asch experimen-
tal paradigm, such experiments are unable to distinguish between
multiple possible learning rules that posit a positive relationship
between trait popularity and probability of trait adoption. For
example, as depicted in Figure 1, conformity, anti-conformity,
and random copying all result in more popular traits being more
likely to be adopted than less popular traits (Boyd and Richer-
son, 1985), yet amongst these only conformity would lead to the
homogenization of group behavior; anti-conformity erodes any
group preferences whilst random copying does not act to change
trait frequencies. Secondly, a disproportionate tendency to adopt
the majority behavior is only expected in cases where the observ-
ing individual is naive (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). This means
that the Asch paradigm is unsuitable to investigate conformity in
the context of cultural evolution as the simplicity of the tasks used
meant that the subjects were far from naive when listening to the
decisions of the confederates. Instead, asocial information must be
controlled for, either experimentally, by using a design such that
subjects genuinely are in a state of naivety, or statistically, such
that a measure of asocial information is taken and can be used in
analyses to separate the effects of asocial and social information.
Given this, empirically minded cultural evolutionists have carried
out further studies to investigate the nature of the response to
variant frequency.
ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS
Before considering experiments with human subjects it is well
worth noting that social learning researchers have carried out
a great deal of work with other animals looking for conformist
learning. This provides further insights into the third of Tinber-
gen’s questions, evolutionary history, as through a consideration
of the current taxonomic distribution of conformity researchers
are potentially able to infer the most likely evolutionary history of
the trait. In fact, evidence in line with conformity exists in a wide
range of taxa including ﬁsh (Day, 2001; Pike and Laland, 2010),
rats (Konopasky and Telegdy, 1977; Galef and Whiskin, 2008),
monkeys (Dindo et al., 2009), and great apes (Whiten et al., 2005),
although in the latter case the claim for conformity rests on a more
normative notion. It should be noted, however, that the methods
employed in these studies, as in the Asch experiment, are typically
not sufﬁcient to rule out other forms of social learning that involve
a positive relationship between trait popularity and the likeli-
hood of its adoption. The only study of which we are aware that
provides clear evidence of non-human animals exhibiting a dis-
proportionate tendency to adopt the majority behavior is Pike and
Laland’s (2010) investigation of public information use in stick-
lebacks. Given the taxonomic distance between ﬁsh and humans,
this ﬁnding ismost likely to reﬂect convergent selection for confor-
mity rather than a homologous capability (Laland et al., 2011b).
Thus, although intriguing, more detailed experimental work is
required tounderstandboth the evolutionaryhistoryof thehuman
capability for conformity, and its phylogenetic distribution.
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
Concerninghumans,however, there havebeen several experiments
with the required precision to distinguish a disproportionate ten-
dency to adopt the majority decision from other rules that lack the
same population level consequences. Efferson et al. (2008) carried
out an experiment inwhich subjects chose between two“technolo-
gies.” The subjects knew the alternative technologies had different
expected payoffs, but did not know which was the better technol-
ogy. Over many rounds the subjects repeatedly chose between the
two technologies. Half the subjects were asocial learners and were
given feedback concerning the payoffs of their decisions, the other
subjects were social learners and were only given information on
the decisions of the asocial learners. Although conformity was
found to be an effective strategy for the social learners, Efferson
et al. found that only the behavior of some subjects in the social
learning condition, those that self-deﬁned as conformist, could be
well explained with a conformist model, whilst the behavior of the
other subjects, who did not describe their behavior as conformist,
could not. Efferson et al. characterize this difference in terms of a
mixed population of conformists and“mavericks,” the latter repre-
senting individuals typically reliant on asocial information. There
was considerable individual-level variation within the conformist
and maverick groups, suggesting that a dichotomy of types would
not be an appropriate interpretation – rather, individuals vary in
the extent to which they utilize social information and/or tend to
conform.
A further experiment (McElreath et al., 2005) also used a design
where subjects were required to choose between two technologies,
and once again subject differences were found in the use of social
information. Furthermore, although subjects did sometimes show
a conformist response, they did not do so when the environment
was stable, a result at odds with theory that suggests environ-
mental stability is the ideal scenario for conformity to do well
(Henrich and Boyd, 1998). In addition to this Toelch et al. (2010)
found that subjects track variant popularity over time and in effect
anticipate a future majority choice by favoring variants that show
increasing popularity. This makes sense in the context of possible
environmental change and such behavior may allow individuals
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rapidly to take advantage of emerging technologies and overcome
the cultural inertia that conformity imposes.
Following these conﬂicting ﬁndings, studies are now turning
to the idea of ﬂexible conformity and attempting to identify fac-
tors that inﬂuence whether or not, and under what circumstances,
subject behavior is conformist. To this end we carried out a study
(Morgan et al., 2011) in which subjects were required to decide
whether a pair of 3D shapes were the same shape seen from
different angles or different shapes entirely (cf. Shepard and Met-
zler, 1971). Over multiple trials, subjects were initially allowed
to attempt the task themselves and were asked to make a deci-
sion and rate their conﬁdence in their decision. They were then
shown the decisions of a group of previous subjects who had been
faced with the same shape pair (the number of demonstrators was
either 4, 8, or 12, one trial per subject involved no social infor-
mation) and were again asked to make a decision and rate their
conﬁdence in it. Crucially, this design recorded subjects’ decisions
and conﬁdence both before and after receiving social information,
allowing us to separate the social and asocial information in the
subjects’ decision making. We found that subjects were dispropor-
tionately likely to adopt the social majority decision only when the
number of demonstrators was high and subjects were uncertain
in their own abilities (see Figure 2). Further analyses examined
the effect of social information in isolation and identiﬁed a gen-
eral conformist response underlying subject decision making (see
Figure 2). The effect of the popularity of the modal choice inter-
acted with the size of the group of demonstrators, however, with
increasing group size corresponding to an increasingly dispropor-
tionate response to popularity. This is in concordance with theory
that shows that the information provided by a majority of a given
size hinges on the size of the overall population (see ESM, Mor-
gan et al., 2011). Accordingly, we provide evidence that there is a
conformist bias underlying human decision making and that in at
least some circumstances human behavior will match conformist
predictions. Finally, we were able to show that subjects’ use of
social information in the experiments was adaptive in the sense
that it increased their performance across the experiment, in line
with the adaptive predictions of evolutionary models.
THE NEURAL BASES OF CONFORMITY
Whilst the aforementioned studies by social psychologists have
made ground in isolating the social contexts that elicit conformity,
this is just one aspect of the immediate causes of this behavior. A
complete understanding requires some knowledge of what goes on
in the brains of conforming individuals. However, the neural-level
processes underlying conformity have received comparatively little
attention.
Nonetheless, recent studies investigating the neurobiology of
social learning more generally have come up with several relevant
ﬁndings. Firstly, studies using both mental rotation tasks (Berns
et al., 2005) and auditory tasks (Berns et al., 2010) have found
that social information affected neural activity in the relatively
low level processing areas associated with each task, in addition
to areas distinct from these perceptual decision making circuits,
suggesting that the social information was affecting the percep-
tion of the subjects as well as their decision making, a possibility
raised by Asch in the interpretation of his ﬁndings (Asch, 1955).
In addition to this, ventral striatum activity in a music choice task
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010) suggests that the social infor-
mationwas directly affecting the perceived value of different songs.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that social and asocial
sources of information are integrated starting at early stages of
processing, however, the low temporal resolution of fMRI limits
the strength of such a conclusion. Finally, Mason et al. (2009)
exposed subjects to symbols that received positive, negative, or no
social labeling. Exposure to a socially marked symbol resulted in
FIGURE 2 | (A) Morgan et al. (2011) found that adult human subjects were
disproportionately likely to switch their decision to that favored by the
majority only when they were presented with a large group of
demonstrators, they were uncertain in their own abilities to solve the
tasks and the majority was very large. (B) However, controlling for prior
asocial information showed that the response of subjects to the social
information in isolation was more generally conformist, as illustrated by
the S-shaped curve. In this case the y -axis reﬂects the change to a linear
predictor prior to transformation into a probability and the shape of the
curve was not constrained in any way.
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activity in the medial prefrontal cortex, irrespective of whether it
was positively or negatively marked, whilst activity in the caudate
coded the valence of the social marking. These ﬁndings suggest
that it is through the integration of activity in these two areas that
individuals distinguish between positively and negatively socially
marked stimuli.
For subjects to be employing a conformist learning bias we
would predict there to be parts of the brain that evaluate lev-
els of consensus amongst demonstrators. Whilst no data exists
for studies using sufﬁciently large groups of demonstrators with
varying levels of consensus, there are nonetheless hints of the
existence of such a mechanism in the brain. The music choice
experiment (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010) found that along
with activity in the insula cortex and right tempoparietal junction,
areas associated with monitoring the decisions of others, ante-
rior insula activity increased when the two“expert” reviewers were
in agreement. Although this is suggestive of a consensus evalu-
ating mechanism it should be noted that with a group of only
two demonstrators the social information was either in unanimity
or in total disagreement, thus the anterior insula may have been
responding to social information with an overall message and not
the speciﬁc level of consensus itself. What is more clear, however,
are changes in brain activity caused by disagreement between the
subject and the demonstrators. Klucharev et al. (2009) found that
disagreement between the subject and the demonstrators caused
activity in several areas known to be involved with more general
error and conﬂict processing such as the rostral cingulate zone
(Botvinick et al., 2004) and depressed activity in reward centers
such as the nucleus acumbens in the ventral striatum. Thus, brain
areas that evaluate object value, such as the ventral striatum in
the music choice task (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010), also
seem to play a role in rewarding the subject for being in agree-
ment with others. Furthermore the magnitude of the change in
activation of these areas predicted changes in subsequent sub-
ject behavior (Klucharev et al., 2009; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010).
Neurobiological experiments are doing more than explaining
phenomena from other ﬁelds, however, they are also highlighting
how those ﬁelds need to broaden their perspectives. For exam-
ple, cultural evolution and social psychology are yet to integrate
the study of normative and informational inﬂuences into a sin-
gle framework (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). Experiments typically
attempt to explain subject behavior in terms of one or the other
source of inﬂuence (e.g., informational; Morgan et al., 2011) and
even posit different behavioral responses when subjects are inﬂu-
enced by one or the other (Campbell and Fairey, 1989). However,
evidence from neurological studies provide evidence that the two
processes may be unavoidably intertwined. For example, Berns
et al. (2005) found increased activity when subjects disagreed with
human participants as opposed to computers, despite the fact that
the taskwasnot obviously normative innature,although this could
be a result of subjects placing more weight on human responses
that those of computers. However, other studies have found activ-
ity in areas strongly suggestive of a normative response, including
the amygdala, an area associated with emotional load, suggest-
ing that subjects found their being in disagreement with others
stressful (Klucharev et al., 2009). Potentially suggesting otherwise,
a study into the social modiﬁcation of memory (Edelson et al.,
2011) in which subjects were asked questions about a video they
had watched several weeks earlier, both before and after being
given false information, found that the amygdala showed increased
activity only when the information purportedly came from other
individuals (as opposed to computers) and when the subject sub-
sequently altered their long-term responses accordingly. That no
such activity was seen when behavioral adjustments were tempo-
rary suggests the activity was related to memory modiﬁcation and
so an emotional load may not have been involved, however, the
activity was only seen when the information came from humans
indicative of a normative aspect.A further study (Berns et al., 2010)
found similar activity in the insula, an area associated with anx-
iety and ostracism, whilst another (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010) found activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex, an area linked
with reputation management, this activity also predicted subse-
quent behavioral adjustments to the group norm. The similarities
between the response to human and computer decisions could
be interpreted as subjects anthropomorphizing the computers,
or alternatively treating human demonstrators as machines. Such
ﬁndings imply that if researchers are to understand social infor-
mation use, including conformity, at the behavioral level it may be
insufﬁcient to consider it in light of either informational or nor-
mative inﬂuence in isolation as they may not be distinct processes
at the neural level. A more complete theory of social decision
making may need to include both, with variable payoffs associ-
ated with getting the correct answer and ﬁtting in with group
mates. Experiments where both are included and their relative
strengths manipulated could help our understanding of how the
two interact. Fromthis perspective, social decisionmaking involves
a maximization of reward taking into account the information
provided by others on the group norm and the level consensus
behind it, the expected cost of deviating from such a consensus,
the individual’s own information concerning the task, the infor-
mation provided by others concerning the task, and the expected
cost of making an incorrect decision. To proceed with our under-
standing of social decision making it may be necessary to combine
the above elements into a single theoretical framework and to
stop thinking of behavior in terms of either normative and social
inﬂuences.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFORMITY
The fourth of Tinbergen’s questions, ontogeny, is one area that
the study of conformity has left relatively untouched. Researchers
have tended to assume that any conformist bias is an evolved
predisposition, and have not generally sought to investigate how
its expression changes during the lifetime of an individual. The
study of trust in developmental psychology (Harris, 2007; Harris
and Corriveau, 2011) however, is of clear relevance to this topic.
Young children have been shown to be remarkably sensitive to a
range of factors when deciding how to use social information and
although work has generally focused on reliability (Koenig and
Harris, 2005, 2007; Fusaro and Harris, 2008; Corriveau and Har-
ris, 2009), studies have replicated the Asch experiment with young
children (Corriveau and Harris, 2010) and have found a persistent
bias for relying on individuals who ﬁt in well with the child’s cul-
tural group (Corriveau et al., 2009). Were such studies extended
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to examine the impact of different levels of consensus it would
be highly illustrative with regards to the ontogeny of conformity.
Indeed, there is already evidence that learning rules vary over time.
For example, children of different ages show a shift in sensitiv-
ity to reliability assessment that may be experientially triggered
(Clement et al., 2004). There is also support for this from neuro-
biological experiments, for example, the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, right middle temporal gyrus, and the right superior tem-
poral sulcus at the temporal junction have been found to monitor
the reliability of informants in a manner similar to dopaminergic
activity in reward learning (Behrens et al., 2008). This implies that
expected values are estimated for different sources as the subject
gains feedback from their decisions. These areas are also involved
in motive attribution in social tasks, suggesting that social relia-
bility takes a multitude of distinctly social factors, such as deceit,
into account (Behrens et al., 2008). Similarly, whilst activity in
the anterior cingulate sulcus monitors volatility in the expected
reward value of non-social decisions, the anterior cingulate gyrus
monitors volatility in the expected reward value of following the
advice of others (Behrens et al., 2008). These two sources were
then combined in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex with the
relative activity of the two streams predicting which stream best
corresponds with behavior (Behrens et al., 2008). This continuous
assessment of the value of social information and demonstrators
implies that the ontogeny of social learning biases may be more
complicated that many experimentalists have typically assumed.
CONCLUSION
From the above we can see that Tinbergen’s four questions of
history, ontogeny, function, and causation are highly instructive
in identifying areas in which our understanding of conformity
and social learning rules more generally needs to be developed.
With large amounts of theoretical and empirical data on the topic,
researchers are beginning to identify when individuals will con-
form, and with further careful non-human experimental work
theywill soonbe able to understand the current taxonomic distrib-
ution of such a bias. However, recent neurobiological experiments
show that a complete understanding of conformity likely requires
integration across these categories. It may no longer be fruitful
to view conformity in a solely normative or informational world,
as the human (and likely non-human) brain seemingly does not
separate the two. Further work is required to explore how expe-
rience can affect the development of conformist learning, with
clear implications for both individual differences, and the use of
social information in general. Whilst multiple approaches have
found a range of exciting results, researchers are now at the point
at which integration is required for the biological understanding
of conformity.
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